Gaddafi’s Demise Is Not The Only Reason for The Military Coup in Mali

A guest post by Jonathan van Eerd, a PhD candidate at the University of Zurich. He recently completed field work in Mali’s capital city, Bamako, and is currently a visiting scholar at Cornell University.


Mali was considered to be one of the few functioning democracies in West Africa. It never experienced a military coup since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. Considering that, last Wednesday’s coup comes as a surprise.

The group under the lead of so far unknown Capt. Amadou Sonago claims that they have overthrown the democratically elected government of Amadou Toumani Touré (short: ATT) because of its “incompetence” in handling the Tuareg Rebellion in Mali’s North.

The Malian army was indeed poorly prepared for its newest task of defending the nation’s unity. The soldiers are badly trained, have outdated weaponry and not enough supply. There were failures in informing soldier’s families about fatalities in combat.

Mali is one of West Africa’s few fairly working democracies. Why was there no national or international political force that pleaded for the strengthening of the Malian forces in the combat against the rebellion?

Being one of the least developed countries in the world, the internationally supported downfall of the Gaddafi’s regime in Libya caught Mali on the wrong foot. Many of Gaddafi’s former Tuareg-soldiers became jobless and went back to the Sahel region, of which Mali’s North is a part. They have not been disarmed by anyone. And in January of this year they started a new Tuareg-rebellion in Mali’s North. Its goal is the independence of Mali’s northern regions.

Mali has experienced recurring Tuareg-rebellions since the sixties. However, the intensity of this new rebellion was unprecedented. Along with that appeared a new generation of well-armed Tuareg-fighters, which came back from Libya. Together with some factions of older Tuareg-rebellions, they formed the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).

The Malian government and its army were taken by surprise. They were ill-prepared because the peace treaty they have signed after the last Tuareg-rebellion in 2008 with the old generation of Tuareg-rebells and the generous “development aid” of the Malian government for the Tuareg to keep them at ease gave the government a misleading feeling of security. Additionally, the foreign, most notably French, diplomatic and military aid for Mali was rather weak or even counterproductive: The French engaged in direct talks with the MNLA, because they hoped to gain their help in France’s battle against the terror-organization Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQMI), which kidnapped and murdered French and other Western tourists and expats in the region. This boosted the MNLA’s self-confidence and led to diplomatic tension between France and its former colony.

But these are not the only causes of the coup. One important cause lies in the nature of ATT’s governing style and Mali’s political culture itself. ATT, who was without any partisan affiliation, preferred to govern with a consensual-styled all-party cabinet. Since his re-election in 2007 he included every important party – with one exception – in one way or another in his government: Out of 160 parliamentarians, only 4 of a small socialist party were in the opposition before the coup.

In such an ethnically heterogeneous country like Mali the inclusion of every important power-base has many advantages. The fact that Mali experienced relative stability or no ethnic conflicts in contrast to its neighbors Ivory Coast, Niger or other West African countries in the last 20 years proves this point.

However, Mali’s financially and organizationally weak political parties are not only in ATT’s all-party government due to political sanity, but also for their very political survival: In most African democracies and semi-democracies, access to state resources is crucial to win important client’s favor with gifts and other privileges, in order to make sure that they give support in elections. Consequently, no Malian political party was willing to occasionally play the indispensable part of the opposition, meaning that no important party pointed out to the deficiencies and failures of the ATT government in its handling of the newest Tuareg-rebellion. The parties did not want to risk their participation in the government and the consequential loss of access to state resources.

Switzerland is the world’s most famous example of a functioning consensus democracy. However, in contrast to Mali and most other democracies in the world, Switzerland’s democracy features extensive direct-democratic rights for Swiss citizens. This ensures that the citizens itself occasionally play the missing part of the opposition to a consensus government.

As no party wanted to harm its share in the Malian government, they criticized ATT only off the record for his lack of foresight on the fallout of the conflict in Libya, his hesitant diplomatic and military reaction, as well as his almost non-existent information policy regarding the rebellion in the North.

On the contrary, all political parties awaited ATT’s orderly replacement in April’s presidential elections. The unexpressed consensus was to first await the new president and only after that to strive for a solution of the conflict in the North. Until then, the parties concentrated on their preparations for the elections. Yet even while doing that, they did not consider to raise the issue of the Tuareg-rebellion as a topic for their individual election campaigns; again for the sake of the all-party consensus.

As a result, one part of the Malian army decided to take matters, or respectively, the part of the opposition in their own hands. In a drastic and non-democratic manner they pointed out the deficiencies and grievances of their army.

Diffusion everywhere: Uprising in North Africa


Egyptian police have used tear gas and water cannon to break up rare anti-government protests in the capital. Thousands of people had joined the protests in Cairo, inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and vowing to stay in place until the government fell.

In a recent article on the diffusion of regime contention in Europe between 1830 and 1940, Kurt Weyland writes:

Tapping in the dark in their own country, oppositionists are easily impressed by a shining example elsewhere. The unexpected fall of a foreign autocrat suggests to disaffected groups in other polities that the time has come for the decisive move. If a seemingly powerful regime is suddenly revealed as brittle, they are tempted to believe that their own ruler is equally weak and that their compatriots are willing and able to shake off the yoke of nondemocracy as well. Given that citizens of the first country achieved an unexpected success, they should manage to accomplish the same feat! Given the imperfect information and high uncertainty prevailing under autocracy, an external precedent can exert great impact, prompting an immediate updating of situational judgments, suggesting a propitious opening, and thus triggering a rash of challenges. The precedent of a foreign success can acquire disproportionate importance and suddenly reshape political actors’ assessments of opportunities and risks. In these ways, a stunning precedent can inspire many efforts at emulation and thus provide a powerful impetus for change.

Moreover, Weyland argues that the outcomes of the diffusion process can be quite diverse. In addition to the successful replication of the protests (which is quite rare) and to their failure, diffusion can lead to:

– preemptive reforms, with which authorities attempt, often successfully, to prevent their downfall, but which can bring significant progress towards democracy;

– determined repression, which reinforces the authorities’ stronghold on power and reduces the prospects democratization prospects in the medium term.

The latter scenario implies that outcomes in different countries are negatively correlated, which is a good reminder that diffusion needs not lead to convergence.

The second WTO

The World Toilet Day of the WTO is in 10 days. Why do we have a World Toilet Day? It is nothing to celebrate. It is a reminder that more effort is needed to provide 2.6 billion people without access to sanitation with a toilet. Whereas a lot of progress has been made in the last decades to supply people around the world with access to safe drinking water, little or no progress has been made to provide them with adequate sanitation. But if we belief the health literature, adequate sanitation is as (if not more) effective to reduce child morbidity and mortality as safe water access (a recent literature review can be found on the website of 3ie). A recent Lancet’s editorial even argued that “adequate sanitation is the most effective public health intervention the international community has at its disposal” (The Lancet Editorial, 2007).

If the health impacts of improved sanitation are as large, why are still so many without it?  There are several economic reasons I can think of, why this might be the case: first, the direct health benefits of improved sanitation – involving invisible bacteria and parasites – are hard to understand and internalize, especially for populations with little or no formal education. Improved water access – in contrast – has in addition to health benefits often direct economic benefits in form of large time savings to collect water. Second, with high initial costs of sanitation facilities and (uncertain) health benefits that might only occur in the far future, individuals with limited access to credit and/or high discounting rates will generally under-invest in precautionary health care measures. Third, with disposal of human feces in public areas as a natural alternative to sanitation facilities, the social benefits of proper sanitation are likely to exceed the private ones: positive externalities of sanitation might lead to underinvestment.

But despite possible sub-optimal market outcomes, public investments remain low. Most donors focus their water and sanitation policies on water supply at the expense of sanitation and investments in adequate sanitation are usually not high on the policy agenda of domestic governments. The cynical observer might argue that sanitation, or the disposal of human waste, is an unpopular subject, which might not be appealing for both international aid agencies and national governments. But I can also think of two other closely linked reasons. First, there is still a lack of clearly defined solution strategies – not from an engineering but from a social science point of view – and second, and directly linked to the first point, the lack of research in social sciences on sanitation is striking. Being an economist, I did a quick economic literature review. Research on sanitation barely exists beyond cost-benefit analysis. Between 1970 and 2009 only ten articles with a focus on sanitation were published in 100 of the top economic journals. And the situation is probably not much different in political science…

World Cup 2 – or which countries are studied most?

Inspired by the last post, I thought about complementing the “Social Science Soccer Reading List” with some of my favorite economic works on South Africa – realizing that it was difficult to decide given the large number of very interesting articles on South Africa: me becoming interested in how many articles have been published on South Africa in comparison to other African and other low and middle income countries in general.

A quick study of the number of development country specific publications within the last ten years in two of the major development economics journals (Journal of Development Economics and World Development), revealed two first insights: Development economists like to work (or can better publish) on more developed (middle-income) countries than on the least developed countries, which could largely explain why there are so many more articles on South Africa than on any other African country. Second, several countries have been totally “neglected” by those two development journals within the last 10 years, whereas others are “extensively” studied. 

Determining the underlying factors and dynamics over time would require some deeper analysis, but I already found an interesting article (Robinson et al., 2006) trying to understand the pattern of economic publications across all countries with several linear regressions. In addition to GDP per capita, population size and data availability, the authors  find that tourism receipts and English as the official language are also significantly correlated with the number of articles published about a specific country. 

If anyone knows about other articles looking at country preferences of researchers in social sciences, I would be most interested.

Interviewers’ Incentives and Benford’s Law

I like empirical analysis and I like econometric techniques. But sometimes I think of the data I am applying these techniques to. One month ago we were conducting a large-scale survey in West-Africa. One day we had a household with 17 members. The interview took the whole day. The interview would have taken about 2 hours with a household of 5 members. Often interviewers are paid per questionnaire. Guess what incentives that might create. I have read of a survey in South Africa, where entire households have been invented. This was discovered only after some years when researchers tried to visit households again.

In social sciences, empirical studies have tremendously increased in recent years, and survey data (especially in developing countries) are often the underlying data source. Whereas a lot of effort has been spent to improve econometric techniques to deal with problems of identification biases during data analysis, surprisingly little has been done to improve our understanding of data collection, or in other words interviewer dependent data.

And here comes Benford’s law:

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