Are Albanians smarter than Germans?

Campaign for vote-splitting in GermanyIf there was a catwalk for political institutions, mixed electoral systems would be the newest fashion trend. They are incredibly popular among politicians, pressure groups, and academics all around the world. Mixed electoral systems combine proportional representation with local representation in single-seat districts. Now, just a few weeks before the Constitutional Court of Germany is debating (again) about loopholes in mixed electoral systems, my article about strategic manipulation under these systems has been published online in the International Political Science Review.

In fact, the German electoral system is the best-known example of mixed electoral system, with voters voting simultaneously for a local candidate and for a national party list. Overall (surplus mandates apart), the allocated seats are exactly proportional to the parties’ vote share.

Almost the same electoral system has ended up in chaos in Albania, Italy, Lesotho and Venezuela. As my article shows, political parties can easily organise in a special pattern of strategic voting, which puts the electoral system completely out of order. More precisely, large parties can achieve over-representation by encouraging their voters to split their votes. They vote with the candidate vote (Germany: “Erststimme”) for their favourite party, but cast their list vote (“Zweitstimme”) for a different party, which is allied to their favourite party. If many voters follow this recommendation, then they outsmart the electoral system mechanism which is designed to lead to proportional results. Instead, the parties applying such a strategy will be massively over-represented.

I have simulated the consequences of such electoral strategies, and showed that there is no solution that would prevent them. Interesting enough, however, in 60 years of application of this electoral system in Germany, there is no known instance where such a strategy would have been used at large-scale. My tests (not published) for several recent elections show no sign that vote-splitting between CDU and FDP or between SPD and Greens has anything to do with such a strategy. In contrast, in young democracies, voters and parties have quickly learned how to abuse the electoral system.

De Borda: a wise manThis opens the question whether German-style mixed electoral systems with a compensatory mechanism are of any use at all. Note that there are many seemingly genius electoral systems discussed in the theoretical literature, which nobody would ever use in a real-world democracy, because they have very nice outcomes if everybody votes sincerely, but have devastating results, once actors start playing them strategically. This is why, for instance, the father of the Borda Count, Jean-Charles de Borda, told that his system was “intended only for honest men”.

I do not think that politicians and voters will ever be honest (except for Germans). Therefore, I am wondering whether German-style mixed electoral systems should be on the catwalk, or rather in the trash bin.

PS: At the NCCR Democracy, we have just started a new research project on mixed electoral systems, jointly with Christian Rubba who has joined us this month. New results coming soon.

Advertisements

Swiss national elections: strategic alliances more important than campaigning?

By Claudia Alpiger* and Daniel Bochsler

List apparentments have heavily affected the distribution of seats in the national assembly, also in the recent national elections of Switzerland. Our analysis, published today in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, shows that the Green Liberal Party has doubled its mandates only due to its strategy of engaging in electoral alliances with different parties in different cantons.
Apparentments are a very rarely seen solution in proportional electoral systems. They are used in 20 out of 26 Swiss cantons, where elections to the national assembly are held by a proportional electoral system, relying on the D’Hondt formula. Under this formula (division allocation rule with rounding down), large parties are strongly favoured over small parties. However, political parties are allowed to link several electoral lists, and the initial seat allocation treats such alliances – called apparentments – jointly as a single unit, even if each party runs with its own list. Thereafter, mandates won by such an alliance are allocated to each of the electoral lists. Such apparentments especially help coalitions of small parties not to loose seats towards large parties (see Bochsler, 2010, Electoral Studies).

For the most recent Swiss parliamentary elections of 23 October, we have simulated the party benefits and losses from apparentment strategies. There are three main winners.
As in previous years, the Social Democratic Party (SPS) and the Green Party (GPS) had a consequential apparentment strategy in almost each canton (except for two cantons, Aargau and Ticino). This helped the SPS – the biggest party in this apparentment – to gain six seats, and the Green Party won four seats. The Green Liberals joined the left-wing-green alliance only in one canton, Graubünden, but won a seat there, only thanks to this apparentment.
Equally, the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) benefitted with six seats from apparentments. The party was lucky to find several new small centre-right parties, being very compatible with the CVP for joining apparentments.
The third party which equally benefitted from apparentments were the new Green Liberals (6 seats won). They engaged in flexible alliances, in many cantons with the CVP and the BDP, but in others also with various small parties, spanning the whole political spectrum from the left (GPS) to the far right (with the Christian-conservative EDU), and in one canton (Graubünden) allied to the SPS. The benefit of six gains due to list apparentments is quite remarkable, given the total of only 12 mandates that the party won in the national elections. Given these numbers, the right alliance strategy probably paid out much more than the electoral campaign.
The loser of the apparentments is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Due to their increasing political isolation in the Swiss party landscape, they engaged in apparentments almost only with the small Christian-conservative EDU in several cantons, the anti-immigration party Lega dei Ticinesi in the canton of Ticino, and in one case (Vaud) with the Liberals (FDP). These apparentments did not help them to win any seat. Instead, in most cases where other parties won mandates through apparentments, this was paid by the SVP. No wonder a MP of the SVP has now started a proposal to abolish the apparentment system in Swiss national elections.

* Claudia Alpiger works in the Democracy Barometer group at the Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau

Who should elect the Swiss government? The Swiss People’s Party’s strategy as a boomerang

The Swiss People’s Party (SVP) wants Swiss voters to elect the Swiss government (Federal Council) in a direct vote. Today, they submitted a popular initiative, proposing an amendment to the constitution, to the authorities. They were required to collect the signatures of 100,000 citizens for this aim, and now, Swiss voters will be given the opportunity to decide on this proposal in a popular vote in the years to come – unless the party should withdraw its initiative in the meanwhile. As of now, it’s the legislative assembly that elects the government every four years, without any possibility of removing the government from office.

Usually, amendments to the electoral systems are proposed by political parties that expect to profit from such changes. It is not very surprising that the proposition to change the election modus for the Swiss government comes from the Swiss People’s Party. Although the Swiss government is usually composed of a large coalition, and mandates are almost proportionally allocated to the largest parties according to their share of parliamentary seats, in recent elections, the SVP has experienced difficulties to get represented in proportional terms, and/or the parliament refused to elect their official candidates (as they often did, in earlier periods, with Social Democratic candidates).

Surprisingly, however, our analysis shows that the SVP might be an important loser of the change in the electoral rules. In a newspaper article (available in German and in Italian), Karima Bousbah and myself discussed whether the SVP might profit from such a change in the election mode. Therefore, we have analysed the elections of the governments in 22 Swiss cantons, which are already elected directly, according to the same rules as they would apply at the national level. (While in the newspaper articles, we solely report correlation analyses, and some descriptive data, we also used panel data over the last 20 years, in order to understand why and when the SVP manages to win seats in governments, and when not.)

Similarly as at the national level, and despite the direct election by majority rules, cantonal governments are large coalitions, which roughly follow the rules of proportional seat allocation. Only the SVP is severely under-represented, holding 23% of the mandates in cantonal parliaments, but only 14% of the governmental seats. The SVP addresses right-wing, conservative voters, but the position of the party branches used to vary across cantons, especially before a party split in 2008. The most radical branches of the SVP often have difficulties in building alliances to other parties. In order to get their candidates elected under majority vote systems, the SVP relies on the support of the other right-wing parties, the Liberals (FDP) and the Christian Democrats (CVP). Where the SVP has a very pronounced right-wing position, it has difficulties to do so.

Also, young party branches fail to get their candidates into governments. Before the 1990s, the party only existed in a few cantons. Elsewhere, the party has difficulties in finding experienced and credible candidates for governmental positions.

Certainly, dynamics in national elections might be slightly different than in cantonal ones, where public attention is low, and candidates are often unknown to the voters. Nevertheless, we argue that the cantonal elections might be the best available indicator of possible governmental elections at the national level.

So why does the SVP start such an initiative? Most likely, because the other parties are afraid of a direct election of the government, and the initiative serves the SVP as an instrument to receive certain concessions from the other parties, for instance in December this year, when the Swiss Parliament will elect the Federal Council. Probably this won’t be the last indirect election, though.

The Electoral Effects of Arguments and Partisan Cues: A First Peek at Experimental Evidence from the Swiss Deportation Initiative

The Swiss accepted a controversial anti-foreign crime initiative in a direct democratic vote last month. The so-called deportation initiative will soon keep a group of experts busy who have to prepare a detailed legislative proposal to be submitted to parliament. However, already today the deportation initiative keeps at least four political scientists busy. Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner, Marc Helbling and I have started to analyze experimental data generated in the context of the deportation initiative.

We conducted a large-scale survey experiment in the week prior to the referendum to explore the effects of arguments and party cues on citizens’ preferences over the deportation initiative.[1] We randomly exposed respondents to one of the two key arguments that dominated the highly polarized pre-referendum campaign. The Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which instigated the deportation initiative, claimed that immigrants to Switzerland are disproportionately responsible for crime. The SVP argued that the deportation initiative would significantly reduce crime rates and thereby add to public security (pro argument). The Social Democratic Party (SP) said the deportation initiative would violate basic rights guaranteed in the Swiss constitution and even international law (con argument).

The preliminary results look as follows: We find that these arguments had no overall effect on citizens’ vote intentions. Those receiving the pro-argument were no more likely to approve the deportation initiative than citizens who received the con-argument. We also randomly provided respondents with information about which party supported (SVP) or opposed (SP) the deportation initiative. Again, we do not find any difference between these two groups.

However, the preliminary results suggest that may party cues may act as a negative heuristic: Voters who disliked the SP were significantly more likely to vote in favor of the deportation initiative if they received information about the SP opposing the initiative. To track this effect over time, we conducted a second survey in the week after the referendum, in which we called the same individuals. We find that the effect persists. Even two weeks after SP-nonidentifiers had received the SP cue, these citizens opposed the deportation initiative more strongly and had voted significantly more often in favor of it than voters who had received no such information.

The group of experts will have to submit their legislative proposal to the Swiss parliament by July 2011. We have decided to beat the experts at least once by delivering a working paper until June 2011.


[1] We thank the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and DemoSCOPE for financial support.

How to Study Things that Can Go Around in Circles

Two voters plus three voters makes five voters. If a party that used to hold four ministries loses one, it still controls three ministries. For many phenomena that we analyze in political science this linear world view seems appropriate or at least an acceptable simplification. But for many it does not. If terrorists used to attack at around 11pm, but now these attacks tend to happen two hours later, this means that they occur at 1am. If political candidates compete on a circular issue space, then a candidate moving far enough to the left will eventually end up at the extreme right. We measure such phenomena on circular scales: the 24-hour clock, compass direction, or calendar measurement. They do not have an origin, since the endpoints are connected.

Although examples for political events measured on circular scales abound, we still lack appropriate methodological tools to analyse this type of data. In an article recently published in Political Analysis, Jeff Gill and Dominik Hangartner start filling this gap. One of their applications analyzes the direction of party movements. This relates to a post by Romain Lachat (“Which Way from Left to Right“), where he conceptualized political competition in the Zurich municipal elections as taking place on a circle. The figure below shows the direction in which parties moved from 2002 to 2006. Most parties shifted to what many would call the economic right.

 

Figure: Directions of party movements in Europe from 2002 to 2006. Source: Gill and Hangartner 2010 (working paper version)

Another application contributes to research on violent conflict. Experts estimate the number of civilian fatalities in Iraq since the beginning of the Second Iraq War to exceed 80’000 deaths. An analysis of the time at which these incidents occurred (table 1), measured on the 24-hour clock, suggests that fatalities due to gunfire or mortar rounds happen on average earlier during the day than incidents due to bomb attacks, which form the reference category.

Table: Results for timing of attacks involving civilian fatalities in Iraq

 

While the signs of the coefficients indicate the direction of the relationships between the predictors and the time of incident, interpreting their size requires some trigonometric computations which the article describes in detail. The results suggest that gunfire casualties happen on average about one hour earlier than bombings. Moreover, their timing has shifted over the years. Directly after U.S. forces had invaded Iraq in 2003, bomb attacks used to occur Saturdays shortly before 8am on average. Such attacks now happen later during the day. The annual shift equals about one hour on average. I look forward to seeing papers that analyze circular data in political science!

A new look at issue ownership effects

The notion of ‘issue ownership’ is frequently used in analyses of party strategies. Parties are said to ‘own’ an issue when they develop a reputation of competence and attention in that domain. Right-wing parties, for example, have traditionally been associated with issues such as security, while left-wing parties usually own issues such as unemployment. Parties are expected to attract more voters when one of ‘their’ issues is high on the political agenda. The more citizens care about unemployment, for instance, the stronger they should be inclined to vote for the party deemed most competent to handle that issue. Parties’ electoral fortunes should thus be related to the salience of their favoured issues.

While the aggregate level consequences of ownership are straightforward, the corresponding individual-level mechanism is less well known.

Continue reading